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JCS 2304/85, dtd 31 Oct 62, Cy No. 15

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NW 34505
By DDJDE, NARA, Date 3/28/13

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A/lc Rohrbough, W.	1 Nov 62		
Mr. Gillison, L.			
MSGT Bachman, C.W.			
L/C E. J. Morgan Jr.			
L/C J. B. Arzberger			
Ma, J. P. Morrison			
Sgt A. J. ... Jr.			
... Ros			
...			
...			
Norma Neary	21 Jun 63		
Mr. Joseph F. Souza	21 JUN 1963		
Mr. Godfrey T. Swann	21 JUN 1963		
Vivian Sue Walden	25 Jun 63		

REMARKS

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31 October 1962

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS IF BUILD-UP IN CUBA CONTINUES
DESPITE RUSSIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE QUARANTINE (U)*RL (62) 38-9 Cuba (4)
st/JCS
st/JCSM*

1. At their meeting on 28 October 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to forward the attached memorandum, together with its Appendices A and B, to the Secretary of Defense.

2. The memorandum was forwarded as JCSM-831-62, dated 28 October 1962.

3. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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~~TOP SECRET~~THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JCSM-831-62

28 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Alternative Actions if Build-up in Cuba Continues
Despite Russian Acceptance of the Quarantine (U)

1. As the President indicated in his speech, the quarantine of Cuba is the initial step in obtaining the withdrawal or removal of offensive missiles. He further stated that additional action would be forthcoming if the situation indicated such to be appropriate to accomplish these objectives.

2. Experience has shown that positive action pulls our Allies with us, whereas inaction results in doubt as to our resolve. Announcement of additional steps to increase the pressure is urgently required to demonstrate not only to the USSR and Cuba, but also to our Allies, that the United States is moving forward, as the President emphasized, to accomplish all the steps outlined in his message of 22 October 1962. The United States has the advantage now as the result of our forceful action, but the momentum of that advantage must be maintained by application of additional force at timely intervals.

3. A series of direct and indirect actions against Cuba in the event that the President's objectives are not achieved in a timely manner and Soviet offensive weapons are not eliminated are discussed below. Also, disclosed below is a series of provocative actions that could cause Castro to make a mistake thereby gaining increased political acceptability and justifying an increased level of US retaliatory actions.

4. Indirect Actions. The following actions should be considered for adoption in order to maintain the initiative and put increasing pressure on Cuba to remove voluntarily their existing offensive weapons capability:

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a. Intensify efforts to extend denial of landing and overflight rights to planes en route to Cuba.

Pros -

- Denies USSR air transport to Cuba
- Involves no serious risk of shooting incidents

Cons -

- Fails to force removal of offensive weapons
- Fails to remove Castro government

b. OAS continue to demand that Castro destroy or remove from the hemisphere all offensive nuclear weapon capability and submit to inspection and verification by OAS.

Pros -

- No further heightening of tensions
- Achieves US objective if accepted

Cons -

- Fails to remove Castro government and so does not eliminate possibility of reintroduction of weapons

c. OAS request United States, as an agent of the OAS, to continue surveillance of Cuba to help OAS evaluate the threat. Pilots of other members of OAS to participate as practicable and planes to be clearly marked and identified as being OAS planes.

Pros -

- Maintains essential flow of intelligence on Cuban progress at missile sites under auspices of international body
- Provides intelligence required for execution of all contingency plans
- Maintains pressure on Cuba through continuing show of force

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~~TOP SECRET~~d. Intensify psychological warfare efforts.Pros -

- Enhance anti-Castro sentiment in Cuba
- Does not provide basis for retaliation by Cuba/USSR

Cons -

- Fails to remove offensive weapons or Castro government

5. Provocative Actions

The purpose of these actions is to induce the Cubans to fire on US elements, or make some mistake which would make politically acceptable and justify subsequent US air strikes or invasion. In order to prepare the best foundation for certain of the actions, it would be particularly desirable to have the OAS appoint the United States as executive agent for the OAS in maintaining surveillance of Cuba. In addition, we should ask OAS nations to furnish reconnaissance planes or pilots for US reconnaissance planes. OAS ships should be used for some of the close-in patrols described below.

Preliminary to any air strike or invasion, certain tasks must be performed for operational reasons. These include photo missions, air reconnaissance, beach reconnaissance, and electronic countermeasures, among others. The very nature of these operations can make them provocative, and they serve a dual purpose. It should be noted that all of the direct or indirect actions listed in paragraphs 4 and 6 herein result in one degree of provocation or another.

Examples of provocative actions are listed below, generally in descending order of semblance of legality:

a. Constant, round-the-clock air photo missions at high, medium, and low altitude, accompanied at night with many flares.

b. Destroyer patrols constantly around the islands. Cruiser patrols directly off Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and other selected cities. These patrols would operate initially at the three-mile limit; later they might "inadvertently" get inside the three-mile limit for increasing periods of time.

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c. Harass Cuban shipping off ports or along coasts. Board and inspect. Direct Cuban ships to US ports for inspection.

d. Off-shore patrol ships conduct gun-firing exercises firing parallel to the shoreline. At night, conduct exercises using illuminating projectiles with illumination to be concentrated off cities and harbors.

e. If KOMAR or PT approach off-shore patrol ships day or night, take provocative action to confuse crews.

f. "Carelessly" extend the landing patterns of our aircraft at Guantanamo to include much of the surrounding Cuban countryside, dropping anti-Castro/Communist leaflets while over Cuban territory.

g. From time-to-time bring a major carrier task group within easy view of large coastal cities. Conduct flight operations.

h. Conduct flight operations (carrier or shore-based fighters) to confuse Cuban radar sites and create command uncertainty. Conduct mixed high-level to low-level, low-level to high-level flights in direct run in with legal limit turnaway. Create sonic booms over Havana and other Cuban centers.

i. Conduct active ECM to jam all Cuban electronic emissions.

j. Conduct simulated amphibious assault using electronic devices to confuse radars and loud speaker systems to create noise to unsettle Castro's militia.

k. Intense Psychological Warfare:

(1) Leaflets and electronic communications offering rewards for Cuban MIG defections.

(2) Leaflets and electronic communications requesting Cubans to maintain a list of all informers, party members, and block wardens. Also drop lists of local communists, informers, and block wardens, compiled with assistance of Cuban refugees, over all sizable Cuban towns and cities, promising justice to all these individuals upon Castro's downfall.

(3) Drop copies of photos showing missile sites.

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1. Aerial release of small parachutes with a side arm and few rounds of ammunition at various locations.

m. Drop "Snake" fire-fighter simulators outside military installation and cities.

n. Make intercepts on Cuban military aircraft outside Cuban territorial air space.

o. Conduct continuous fighter sweeps over the island, combined with buzzing of trains, motor vehicles, and public buildings.

p. Put agents ashore to start uprisings against the Castro regime.

q. Publicly announce concern over pollution of the Guantanamo water supply and send a military force into Cuban territory to check and protect the reservoir.

r. Incite riots on Cuban side of Guantanamo fence using members of Guantanamo labor force as agents. Riots would justify our providing military assistance to laborers.

6. Direct Actions

a. Aerial Reconnaissance over Cuba

(1) Day and night flights at irregular hours and at different altitudes.

(2) Fighter sweeps over Cuba in large numbers to show our determination and to bring home the "facts of life" to Cubans about their insecure position.

Pros -

- Will increase photo coverage necessary to intelligence community and President.
- Fighter sweeps will be a demoralizing factor to the populace.

Cons -

- Could provoke counter sweeps over US territory or sneak attack on US installations or cities. (This, however, has added provocative benefits.)

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~~TOP SECRET~~**b. Conduct Covert Actions to Include Sabotage of Missile Systems****Pros -**

- Directly affects the missile that we wish to eliminate.
- Capitalizes on assets available.

Cons -

- Possible compromise of operations.

c. Add POL to the prohibited list**Pros -**

- Will drastically reduce the military effort and bring the economy to a halt and create wide-spread political instability.
- Will put great pressure on Castro to dismantle missile bases.

Cons -

- Missiles will not be immediately eliminated.
- United States would eventually be subject to criticism for humanitarian reasons.

d. If total POL blockade is not considered desirable at this time, a blockade against jet fuel could be imposed**Pros -**

- Will eventually bring military effort to a halt.
- Does not expose the United States to criticism on humanitarian grounds.

Cons -

- Missiles will not be eliminated for a long time.

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e. Total Sea BlockadePros -

- Further build-up prevented.
- Will bring economy to a halt and exert great pressure on Castro to dismantle missile bases.
- Much easier to enforce than partial blockade.

Cons -

- Missiles will not be immediately eliminated.
- United States would be subject to criticism because of humanitarian aspects.

f. Air Blockade

(1) Administrative harassment

(2) Air defense harassment

(3) Denial of Bloc aircraft within 50 miles of US territorial waters and air space

(4) Seizure and destruction of Bloc aircraft within 50 miles of the United States and Cuba

Pros -

- Steps up the blockade effort to maintain initiative.

Cons -

- The Berlin air corridors will be vulnerable for retaliation.

g. Offensive Strikes. Selective strike on 11 MRBM missile sites and jet fields (Reference Appendix B).Pros -

- If completely successful, will eliminate known MRBM missile threat.

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- Could result in Cuban uprising and possible overthrow of Castro government.
- Demonstrates that the United States is withholding all out action against Cuba in favor of elimination of immediate nuclear threat only.

Cons -

- Heightens tensions and could result in escalation.
- Subjects the United States to criticism for humanitarian reasons as well as for aggression.
- Will not immediately solve the problem or immediately eliminate communism from Cuba.

h. Full Invasion

Pros -

- Definitely removes the offensive threat.
- Eliminates the Castro government.
- Removes Soviet influence in Cuba.
- Indicates to OAS and to NATO the will of the United States to protect the Free World from Communist aggression.

Cons -

- Heightens risk of general war.
- Castro may launch any offensive weapons not neutralized in initial air strikes.
- Opens the United States to charges of aggression in world opinion. However, opportunity for the United States to set up a model government and a viable economy should counter this in the long run.

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7. Although direct and indirect provocative actions are provided giving a wide range of choice, direct action to eliminate the offensive weapons threat provides the greatest promise of achieving the US objective for Cuba. Paragraph 2, Annex A of SNIE 11-18-62, dated 19 October 1962, "Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba," fully supports this view. It indicates that the USSR reaction would be approximately the same regardless of the scale of direct military action. All things considered, it appears at this time that the only direct action which will surely eliminate the offensive weapons threat is air attack followed by invasion and is, in the long run, the best course of action.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

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